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Validity of the Admission-Confession Distinction for Purposes
of Admissibility

An admission might very well be called a confession's little brother.
A confession includes an acknowledgment of all of the essential elements in the crime charged and is generally defined as an acknowledgment of guilt.' Admissions, however, are merely acknowledgments of
one or more facts which fall short of supplying all of the essential
elements necessary to constitute the offense charged. Accordingly, an
admission, if it is to be distinguished from a confession, must be something short of an acknowledgment of guilt.2
In determining the admissibility of confessions, the courts have uniformly held that confessions induced by force or threat are inadmissible in evidence, 3 and where the accused asserts such improper inducemQnt, he is entitled to a preliminary hearing on that issue.4 There is,
however, no such unanimity of opinion with respect to admissions.
One line of authority places an admission on a plane with a confession, and the safeguards relating to the voluntary character of confessions are considered equally applicable to admissions. 5 In these
jurisdictions, if the accused alleges that his admissions were the result
of improper inducement, he is entitled to a preliminary hearing on that
issue. The other line of authority, however, does not apply such a test
to the mere admissions of an accused and permits the introduction of
admissions in evidence without a preliminary hearing-in other words,
1 State v. Novak, 109 Ia. 717, 79 N. W. 465 (1899) ; MeCloud v. State 166 Ga. 436,
143 S. E. 538 (1928) ; People v. Wynecoop, 359 1l. 124, 194 N. E. 276 (1935).
2 3 Wigmore Evidence (3rd Ed. 1940) §821 at 239. "A confession in a legal sense
is restricted to an acknowledgment of guilt made by a person after an offense has
been committed and does not apply to a mere, statement or declaration of an independent fact from which guilt may be inferred." Accord: State v. Porter, 32 Ore.
135, 48 Pac. 964 (1897); Chappell v. State, 71 Ga. App. 147, 30 S. E. (2d) 289
(1944).
3 Brain v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 (1897) ; McNabb v. United States, 321 U. S.
332 (1943) ; Ford v. State, 181 Md. 303, 29 Atl. (2d) 835 (1943). The scope of this
note is limited to a consideration of extra-judicial confessions and admissions, i.e.,
statements made outside of court.
4 Brain v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 (1897) ; Rossi v. United States (C.C.A. 9th,
1922), 278 Fed. 349; Winchester v. State, 163 Miss. 462, 142 So. 454 (1932). As to
who has the burden of proving the confession voluntary, see 3 Wigmore, §861 et seq.

and annotation, Voluntariness of a Confession Admitted by Court as Question for
Jury (1935) 85 A. L. R. 870.
5 Asheraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274 (1945); Gullota v. United States (C.C.A.

8th, 1940), 113 F. (2d) 683; Sykes v. United States, 143 F. (2d) 140 (1944) ; McGuire v. State, 299 Ala. 315, 194 So. 815 (1940) ; Louette v. State, 152 Fla. 495, 12
So. (2d) 168 (1943). And for cases which by inference also hold to the same effect,
see: Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 562 (1897); Chambers v. Florida, 309
U. S. 227 (1940) ; McNabb v. United States, 321 U.S. 332 (1943) ; State v. Durkee,
68 R. I. 73, 26 At]. (2d) 604 (1942).
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without a determination of their trustworthy or voluntary character. 6
Thus, in the latter jurisdictions, the distinction between an admission
and a confession becomes highly significant, for on that distinction
hinges the right of the accused to a preliminary hearing concerning the
admissibility of statements
obtained from him by improper police inter7
rogation methods.
The validity of the admission-confession distinction as a test for
determining the admissibility of extra-judicial statements of the accused can best be evaluated by an inquiry into the purpose of such a
classification and the policies behind the rule which subjects confessrons
to a preliminary hearing before admitting them in evidence. Clearly,
if admissions are within the scope and policy of the "confession rule,"
no such distinction can justifiably be maintained.8
The basis of the admission-confession distinction can be found in the
peculiar rules which grew up with regard to the admissibility of confessions. In the early common law periods there were no restrictions at
all upon the reception in evidence of admissions or confessions; but, as
the courts came to recognize that confessions induced by force or threat
might be untrustworthy evidence, the rule of exclusion developed. 9
This rule, broadly stated, is that no confession shall be admissible as
evidence unless shown to be voluntarily rendered or free from any
inducement which may have made the confession untrustworthy as
evidence. 10 Its purpose was originally to prevent the conviction of the
innocent as founded upon a false confession," and in accordance with
that purpose, the necessity of holding a preliminary hearing to test the
trustworthy character of a defendant's confession became apparent.
For, suppose that a confession were admitted in evidence and during
the trial it was shown to be the result of coercion. Even though the
judge might instruct the jury to disregard the confession, it is doubtful
whether the jury could or would forget it. Realizing then, the inherent
prejudice a coerced and untrustworthy confession might have on the
right of the accused to a fair trial, the courts have uniformly required
6 Commonwealth v. Haywood, 247 Mass. 16, 141 N. E. 371 (1923) ; State v. Linsey,
26 N. M. 526, 194 Pac. 877 (1921); Peopl6 v. Fowler, 178 Cal. 657, 174 Pac. 892
(1918); State v. Garvey, 45 Idaho 768, 265 Pac. 628 (1928); State v. Gibson, 69
N. D. 70, 284 N. W. 209 (1939).
7 2 Wharton Criminal Evidence (11th Ed. 1935) §646.
8 Problems which have been dependent upon defining with great care the elements
of a confession and have, as a result, applied the admission-confession distinction are
those which involve the judge's charge to the jury as to whether defendant's statements are a confession or an admission, Owens v. State, 120 Ga. 296, 48 S. E. 21
(1904) ; Moore v. State, 220 Wis. 404, 265 N. W. 10 (1936) ; requirements of corroboration of a confession in proving corpus delicti, United States v. Warsower (C.C.A.
2d, 1940), 113 F. (2d) 100; State v. McLain, 208 Minn 91, 292 N.W. 753 (1940);
the admissibility of statements of the accused in a criminal case, with or without a
preliminary hearing. (Herein considered.) It is this author's view that only one of
these problems need depend upon a strict definition of a confession.
9 3 Wigmore Evidence (3rd Ed. 1940) §§816, 817, and S21 et seq.
10 Professor Inbau points out that "while legal scholars differ somewhat as to
which is the historically accurate test-the test of voluntariness or the test of trustworthiness-as a practical matter it would seem to make little difference which of the
tests is applied. For example, the type of force, threat, or promise that would be
considered sufficient to render a confession involuntary (by a court applying the
test of voluntariness) would in all probability be declared sufficient to render a confession untrustworthy (by a court applying the test of trustworthiness)--and vice
versa." Inbau, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation (2nd Ed. 1948) 150.
11 Supra, note 9.
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a preliminary hearing to determine the trustworthy character of all
confessions. 12 If the judge decides the confession is a result of improper
inducement, the jury will never hear a word of it.
Admissions were not originally subject to the confession rule, both
because their character as substantive evidence against the accused
was significantly less 13 and because it was thought that there was less
chance for mere admissions to be untrustworthy. 14 This, however, is
not necessarily true and depends largely upon where the line is drawn
between an admission and a confession. It is very probable that the
risks of testimonial untrustworthiness are nearly as great in the case
of an admission of some naterial fact as they are in the case of confessions which embody complete acknowledgments of guilt. 15 Wigmore
recognized this when he defined a confession as "an acknowledgment
of the truth of the guilty fact charged or some essential part of it."' 1 6
By expanding the definition of a confession from its generally accepted
meaning as an acknowledgment of guilt to an acknowledgment of some
essential part of it, Wigmore hoped to bring within the scope of the
confession rule all statements which would raise a reasonable inference
of untrustworthiness. Some courts reached a like result by merely
holding that all incriminating admissions, as distinguished from an
admission of subordinate fact, would be subjict to the same tests of
admissibility as a full confession. 7 These authorities were clearly correct, for it followed logically that if statements of an incriminatory
nature, i.e., statements admitting a material fact or some essential element of the crime charged, were admitted in evidence without a preliminary hearing, the prejudicial effect upon the accused would be
nearly as great as in the case of a confession. This is so even though
the judge, upon the finding of improper inducement, instructed th~e
jury to disregard such statements; for, as with confessions, a great deal
of the harm would already have been done.
Admissions of subordinate facts were excluded from the necessity of
a preliminary hearing by Wigmore and other authorities on two theories. The first, based upon an assumption of trustworthiness, reasoned
that the accused would necessarily be unable to purchase freedom from
12 Supra, note 5.
13 State v. Guie, 56 Mont. 485, 186 Pac. 329 (1919) "The distinction between a
confession and an admission is not a technical refinement, but based upon the substantive differences of the character of evidence deduced from each."
14 3 Wigmore Evidence §821 at page 243. "An acknowledgment of a subordinate
fact, not essential to the crime charged, is not a confession; because the supposed
ground of untrustworthiness of confessions is that a strong motive impels the accused
to expose and declare his guilt as the price of purchasing immunity from present pain
or subsequent punishment; and thus by hypothesis, there must be some quality of guilt
in the fact acknowledged. Confessions are thus only one species of admissions, and
all other admissions than those which directly touch upon the fact of guilt are without the peculiar rules affecting the use of confessions." See also, 2 Wharton Criminal
Evidence (11th Ed. 1935) §580.
15 Morgan, Admissions (3937), 12 Wash. L. Rev. 180 at 190.
16 3 Wiginore Evidence (3rd Ed. 1940) §821 at page 238.
17 People v. Heide, 302 Ill.624, 135 N. E. 77 (1922); Winchester v. State, 163
Miss. 462, 142 So. 454 (1932) ; Louette v. State, 152 Fla. 495, 12 So. (2d) .168 at 172
(1943). "The term 'confession' does not apply to a mere admission or declaration
of an independent fact which tends to prove guilt ... but when an admission of an
incriminating fact, or fact from which zuilt may be inferred, is sought to be introduced, the rules governing the admissibility thereof are similar to the rules governing
the admissibility of a confession."
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coercion or other improper inducement by a mere admission of independent facts that do not of themselves directly touch upon some
essential element of guilt. 18 The second theory reasoned that even
though a false or doubtful admission of subordinate fact were admitted
in evidence, the substantive weight of such an admission would be so
small that the accused might still receive a fair and impartial trial if,
upon a subsequent finding of improper inducement, the judge should
instruct the jury to disregard it. This was the type of evidence which
authorities believed the jury could, in fact, forget. 19 Accordingly, while
the dangers that the accused may not receive a fair trial if an admission of subordinate fact is admitted without a preliminary hearing are
not so great, it would seem clear that the courts are relying on a very
thin and elusive distinction in applying the rule that confessions, as
distinguished from admissions, must be proven trustworthy at a preliminary hearing before admissible as evidence. For who is to foretell
which piece of evidence will sway the jury one way or another?
By failing to realize that the trustworthy policy of the confession
rule is aimed not alone at the exclusion of confessions improperly induced but also at any statement which, if coerced, would have a prejudicial effect on the right of the accused to a fair trial,20 many statements,
though admissions in a proper sense (i.e., statements short of a complete
acknowledgment of guilt), have been admitted without a preliminary
hearing in spite of their inherent qualities of untrustworthiness. Examples of this are numerous. 2 1 For instance, a Massachusetts court held
that a statement by an accused, indicted for adultery, that he was guilty
as charged was not to be treated as a confession but as an admission when
the statement was offered against him in a later prosecution charging the
same act of intercourse as incest. 22 As a result of this ruling, the defendant was not entitled to a preliminary hearing on his claim that the
statement was obtained under circumstances which would have made a
confession inadmissible. And in a New Mexico case 23 the defendant,
18 Sapra,note 14.

19 A perfect example of this is seen in Herring v. State, 242 Ala. 85, 5 So. (2d)
104 (1941). In.this case the defendant objected to the introduction of certain statements without a preliminary hearing. The statements were given in answer to a question asking when he (the defendant) last put on his "Idrawers."1 The defendant
replied, " cFriday night, "1 and subsequent scientific examination of these " I drawers"I
made his statements highly incriminatory. Few authorities, however, would say that
an admission of this type of evidence, even though it had been proven the result of
coercion during the trial, would seriously impair the defendant's right to a fair trial
if the judge had made proper instructions to the jury to disregard it.
20 McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence (1938) 16 Texas L.
Rev. 447, 452-457; McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility
of Confessions (1946) 24 Texas L. Rev. 239.
21 Note, Involuntary Admissions Are Not Competent Evidence, 19 Temple L. Q.
485, where the author sets out many cases which demonstrate the failure of the courts
to recognize the trustworthy policy of the confession rule.
22 Here, since all that was necessary to sustain a conviction was the showing of the
relationship necessary to constitute the crime of incest, there should be little reason
to treat it differently than a confession. In A. L. I. A Model Code of Evidence, Rule
505, p. 240, it is stated in reference to the above case, "With all such holdings this
rule is in conflict." See Note (1946) 19 Temple L. Q. 485, Involuntary Admissions
Are Not Competent Evidence.
23 State v. Linsey, 26 N. M. 526, 194 Pac. 877 (1921). The court also made the
broad ruling that an admission is always receivable in evidence without preliminary
proof that it was made voluntarily. How could a ruling like that possibly satisfy the
policy of the confession rule in all cases, whether the policy of the confession rule is
based on a "voluntary in fact" principle or the normal trustworthy test?
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charged with bigamy, admitted a previous marriage but insisted he did
not know whether he had been divorced from his first wife. The court
held that since there was no admission of a second marriage, the statement was not a confession and need not be given a preliminary hearing.
Could not the court here also have held that this was a highly incriminatory admission, one which would have been equally as untrustworthy
as would have been an express acknowledgment of guilt? Finally, in an
Idaho case,2 4 there was an admission by the defendant to the sheriff that
he wanted to plead guilty to the charge of statutory rape. The court, after
considering this statement "in the nature of a confession," held it an
admission and admissible as such without a preliminary hearing-this in
spite of the fact that it was the only substantial evidence available to
corroborate the testimony of the prosecutrix.
The preceding illustrations should serve to demonstrate the invalidity
of the admission-confession distinction as the sole operative basis of admitting extra-judicial statements of the accused with or without a preliminary hearing. The mere classification of a statement as an admission
or confession has no direct bearing on its trustworthy character. A
confession is excluded from the jury's consideration because it may be
untrustworthy evidence. The same test should be used with respect to
admissions. A more appropriate inquiry would be: Were the extrajudicial statements of the accused, whether admissions or confessiois, of
such an incriminatory nature that, had they been coerced, they would be
untrustworthy evidence for the jury's consideration? ]More simply
stated, would the admission of such statements, without a preliminary
hearing, impair the defendant's right to a fair trial!
Heretofore, the discussion of the problems involved in maintaining
the admission-confession distinction for the purposes of admissibility has
assumed that the sole policy of the confession rule is to exclude untrustworthy evidence from the jury's consideration. 25 This is not the
whole truth, however, for some authorities have found a kinship between
the confession rule and the privilege against self-incrimination. They see
in the test of voluntariness an indication that the rules restricting the use
of confessions are prompted by a desire to protect the subject against
torture2 6 as well as by a desire to protect the trustworthiness of the evidence.2 7 The United States Supreme Court was obviously persuaded by
24 State v. Garvey, 25 Idaho 768, 265 Pac. 668 (1928).
25 Supra, note 21.
26 Although Wigmore points out that the establishment of the rule was highly inconsistent with the modern doctrine, 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd Ed. 1940) §865 and
8 Wigmore Evidence (3rd Ed. 1940) §2266 at page 387, and depended largely upon
the collateral conditions indirectly affecting the judge's attitude (these conditions
being the social cleavage, absence of the right to appeal in criminal cases, and the
inability of the accused to -testify for himself or have counsel defend him), the
"Wickersham Report" gave startling information to support the modern doctrine.
"The third degree-the infliction of pain, physical or mental, to extract confessions
or statements-is widespread throughout the country."I National Commission on Law
Observance and Enforcement, Report No. 11, Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (1931)
at 153 (The "Wickersham Report").
27 McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence (1938) 16 Texas L.
Rev. 447, 452-457; McCormick, Some Problems andj Developments in the Admissibility
of Confessions (1946) 24 Texas L. Rev. 239. And in Brain v. United States, 168
U.S. 532 (1897). the court said, "In criminal trials in the courts of the United
States, whenever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not
voluntary, the issue is controlled by that poition of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States commanding that no person shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
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these broader considerations when it laid down its "civilized standards"
rule for Federal cases and its "inherent coercion" rule as a test of due
process in state cases. 28 Accepting this policy, 29 it is only too evident
that whether the extra-judicial statements of the accused are admissions
or confessions in a proper sense, if either had been obtained by compulsion or threat, the Supreme Court would prohibit its use as evidence. In
fact the first and second Asheraft cases gave direct approval to the view
that admissions and confessions should be subject to the same tests for
purposes of admissibility.30 After rejecting the admissibility of a confession in the first Ashcraft case because it had been obtdined under
circumstances which were merely "inherently coercive," the Supreme
Court of the United States remanded the case to the state court. The
state court proceeded to convict the defendant again-this time largely on
the weight of extra-judicial statements of the defendant which the state
court decided were not confessions and therefore not subject to the safeguards of the confession rule. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from
the second conviction, the Court said, "We see no relevant distinction
between the introduction of this statement (here the statement was in
the form of a highly incriminatory admission, exculpatory in nature) and
the unsigned confession, except for the possibility that the admission of
this long concealed knowledge was perhaps a more effective confession of
guilt. . . than the written unsigned alleged confession would have been.
All the reasons given for the reversal of the judgment in the first case
apply in full force."31 Such a decision may indeed be a warning to the
state courts that the admission-confession distinction is completely invalid for purposes of admissibility.
Recognizing, then, that protecting the individual from abusive police
practices, as well as protecting the trustworthy character of the evidence,
are the reasons for requiring a preliminary hearing before admitting a
confession in evidence, it would seem clear that one of two solutions
should be adopted by those jurisdictions which now apply the admissionconfession distinction as a test for determining the admissibility of extrajudicial statements of the accused. Either the present definition of a
confession should be broadened to include a statement that admits an
integral element of the crime charged (as was done by Wigmore) or the
28 Asheraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944). See also a very realistic discussion
of police interrogation before trial in Inbau, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation (2nd Ed. 1948) and his article, Inbau, Confession Dilemma in the United States
L. Rev. 442.
Supreme Court (1948) 43 Ill.
29 It is now possible to directly attribute the policy of deterring "uncivilized"
police practices to the Supreme Court because of their ruling in Upshaw v. United
States, U. S. -, 69 S. Ct. 170 (1948). This opinion expressly dispelled previous
doubts that the Court would use their power of shaping rules of evidence as an indirect mode of disciplining misconduct. From this, in spite of a vigorous dissent in
the Upshaw case, there seems to be a definite trend to the views long ago promulgated
by Justice Holmes when he exprssed the opinion that, apart from the Constitution,
the government should not use evidence obtained by criminal act. We must, he stated,
make a necessary choice between two conflicting desires. First, that all available evidence be used in the detection of criminals; second, that the government should not
itself foster and pay for other crimes in order to secure evidence. Such evidence
should be inadmissible because Iit is a far less evil that some criminals should escape
than that the government should play an ignoble part." Olmstead v. United States,
277 U. S.438 (1928).
30 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S.
274 (1945).
31 Asheraft v. Tennessee, 327 U. S.274, 278 (1945).
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same test should be used to determine the admissibility of both confessions
and admissions.
Expanding the definition of a confession to include any statement
admitting an integral element of the crime charged is, however, a backhanded solution to the problem, for once again the courts will be depending upon a needless classification which furnishes no real insight into the
policies which necessitate a preliminary hearing. Such a solution not
only fails to give complete recognition to the policy of protecting the
accused from coercion and other improper inducement, but it will also
lend further confusion to other evidence problems which necessarily
depend upon an application of the admission-confession distinction in
reaching a correct ruling.8 2 Therefore, in order to eliminate the confusion now existing in distinguishing these problems, and, of more importance, to give fuller recognition to the policy of protecting the accused
from "uncivilized" interrogation methods, it is suggested that the admission-confession distinction be abandoned as a test for determining the
admissibility of extra-judicial statements of an accused.
Objectively viewed, the distinction between a confession and an admission is a difference of degree and not of kind. The use of this distinction
to determine the admissibility of extra-judicial statements not only fails
to recognize the unpredictable nature of the jury, but it also fails to
apprehend the difficulty which confronts the judge in attempting to apply
such a thin and elusive test to the facts of a particular case. Therefore,
while. it may be true that some admissions are not subject to the same
fear of untrustworthiness as are confessions, the difference in degree
does not call for a different test of admissibility. The same reasoning
applies when considering the policy of protecting the accused from abusive police practices, for the mere fact that a statement is an admission
rather than a confession carries no real assurance that such a statement
82 Examples of the confusion occurring in evidence problems which have depended
upon the admission-confession distinction in order to reach a result are numerous.
Perhaps the best example of this may be seen in People v. Fowler, 178 Cal. 657, 174
Pac. 892 (1918). There the defendant admitted killing "X" but claimed that it
was done in self-defense. The court, in applying the admission-confession distinction
as a test of admissibility, proceeded to define with great care the elements of a confession and distinguish it from an admission. Deciding that the defendant's statement lacked all of the elements necessary to constitute a confession (holding that his
assertion of self-defense was, in fact, a denial of guilt), the court introduced this
highly incriminatory statement without a preliminary hearing. In support of this
improper result, the California court merely quoted from three other cases which had
been concerned with the problem of distinguishing an admission from a confession
and adopted the definition of a confession therein set out. Each of these three cases
was in turn concerned not with the problem of admissibility but with the problems of
sufficiency of the evidence to convict and the correctness of the judge's characterization of the defendant's statements to the jury. Accordingly, in adopting a definition
of a confession, these three cases adopted a narrow definition of a confession (a confession as a full acknowledgment of guilt)-a definition which was entirely inappropriate for use in the admissibility problem involved in the Fowler Case. It is believed
that this confusion is due largely to an over-reliance upon an elusive distinction. The
admission-confession distinction is not only unnecessary for purposes of admissibility
but it tends to obscure the policies which lie beneath the rule of law invoked. The
following cases clearly demonstrate the proposition now asserted: Moore v. State, 220
Wise. 404, 265 N. W. 101 (1936) ; State v. Novak, 109 Ia. 717, 79 N. W. 455 (1899) ;
State v. Cook, 188 Ia. 655, 196 N.W. 674 (1920) ; Powell v. State, 101 Ga. 9, 29 S.E.
309 (1879) ; Pressley v. State, 201 Ga. 267, 39 S.E. (2d) 478 (1946).

